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"If two people make out a shape in the distance 
and one says it is a man and the other that it is a 
horse, before jumping to the conclusion that 
neither of them are capable of telling the difference 
between a man and a horse, it is legitimate to 
postulate that what they have seen is a centaur 
(then again, it could be argued that since centaurs 
do not exist, both of them were mistaken)." 
(Bobbio, The Future of Democracy) 
The present economic crisis is not a regional or local crisis, but a systemic one, 
which originated and expanded at the core of developed countries. In the 1980s, a 
debt crisis shook Latin America and Africa. Another one then hit Asia, Russia and 
again Latin America at the end of the 90s. Many countries had their trajectories 
momentarily interrupted, even though they were able to recover rapidly in tune with 
the global economy. 
In the current recession, it is the developed countries that are under the eye of the 
hurricane. Nevertheless, the impact on the emerging countries will be strong. Both 
for those that grew rapidly and benefited from a global environment marked by 
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liquidity and low interest rates, a weak dollar and the rise of commodity prices; as 
well as for the more fragile countries, who will be, once again, the big losers. 
The crisis will not leave developing world unscathed. However, I argue that the 
current financial crisis will not sound the death knell for developing countries' 
recent economic success, as the debt crisis of the 1980s sounded for import 
substitution industrialization (lSI). They will suffer a strong downturn, but some of 
them could emerge stronger from the crisis. 
Exuberant trajectories 
In 2001, Jim O'Neill, Goldman Sachs' economist, coined the term BRIC to 
encapsulate the energy exerted by Brazil, Russia, India and China, the world's 
most promising emerging markets. 
Over the past 50 years, for instance, China, India, Russia and Brazil have followed 
a wide range of recipes, created tools, and experienced different models of 
development. Sometimes they have failed strikingly, as during the Cultural 
Revolution, the glasnost tentative to keep socialist experience going, the Indira 
Gandhi's 1965-75 statist planning, or even in the inward and protectionist bias the 
Brazilian national-developmental model has introduced. But sometimes, they have 
thrived, and often learned a great amount from stumbling. 
The BRIC economies have been studied from different angles and dimensions, 
and economists in general have stressed they would together be larger than the 
G72 by 2035 or 2027 according to a more optimistic view3• However, I claim the 
main lesson they have learned that deserves a more accurate scrutiny is about the 
interactions and synergies between markets and states. Not from a general point of 
view, but in concrete terms, translated by a set of domestic new institutions, 
technological efforts, pro-business policies, and social policies, aimed at mitigating 
poverty and inequality, and, simultaneously, at boosting economic growth. Some of 
2 The first G7 meeting was in 1976, with the finance ministers from the United States, Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom, France, Ganada, and Italy. 
3 In dollar terms. 
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these countries are again pushing through these experiments in democratic 
environments, in contrast with their recent pasts, what is of major significance. 
Something out of the ordinary is afoot in developing countries. This group of 
developing countries is undergoing deep social and economic changes. According 
to the World Bank, more than 400 million people have been pulled above the 
poverty line over the past 25 years. This has occurred mainly because of China's 
outstanding growth. But there was poverty reduction all over the world, basically 
due to the global growth, and the striking developing countries' economic 
performance. 
Developing countries' economies have been growing at a rate of roughly 7% for 
years, clearly unsustainable during the current crisis. Skeptics argued, before the 
crisis, that their striking performance represented only an upswing in the business 
cycle. There are signs, however, that it represented an upward trend in the growth 
rate, interrupted only momentarily by the crisis. If that interpretation is correct, and 
growth in China, India, Russia and Brazil is can be sustained, BRIC countries will 
recover from the crisis more solid than before. 
Some indications have been clear. 
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In 2006 and 2007, the combined output of emerging economies accounted for 
more than half of total world GOP (PPP). 
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As China, India, Russia and Brazil opened up their economies during the 1990's, 
the global labor force doubled. Over the past decade, almost a billion new 
consumers entered the global marketplace'. In 2008, China alone accounted for 
more than 10% of world trade (4% in 2000, purchasing power parity terms). There 
was an increasing vitality in emerging economies, which positively affected global 
growth, not substituting for output elsewhere. 
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And, even more relevant, stronger growth in emerging economies has changed the 
relative returns to labor and capital all over the developed world, shifting relative 
prices and incomes, altering labor and capital costs, prices and manufacturing 
conditions. 
In the present days it seems much easier to regard the acronym BRIC, and discard 
the "decoupling" hypothesis with disdain, given the strong impact provoked by the 
financial crisis all over the world. But the exuberant BRIC economic figures and 
numbers previous to 2009 - both in terms of growth, exports, net reserves, and 
even in science and technology - keep calling for reflection. 
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BRIC countries have built their savings based on years of exports bonanza. But 
most of them have diversified their export-destiny and export-mix. More important, 
they rely increasingly on internal markets what allows them to grow even while the 
United States economy slows. How sustainable could be that movement remains 
controversial. But there are clear signs of a major rebalancing in their domestic 
markets altering the global consumption features. Differently from Europe, Japan 
and the U.S., BRIC consumer's contribution increases slowly, but continuously. 
If the BRICs' succeed in improving their redistributive set of policies, even under 
lower economic growth but with major impact in family income - as already 
happened in Brazil in recent years -, the trend line will continue toward a greater 
economic autonomy. Chinese consumers are at the heart of this shift, and what will 
happen inside China is crucial for the world and, specifically for developing 
countries future. The new programs aimed at supporting medical insurance to rural 
communities linked to a huge public infrastructure spending, announced to be 
implemented until 2011 by the Chinese government, reinforce the relative BRICs' 
consumption weight, and their key position in the world economy. Every step 
8 
forward taken by the BRICs to rebalance their economy and to overcome poverty 
and inequality exerts positive impact on the world economy, allowing the 
decoupling hypothesis emerge from the ashes. 
Uneven economic and social performance 
In spite of some similarities, the biggest developing countries differ in many ways. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China compete with each other, yet sometimes appear 
acting together. Within the acronym BRIC there is much more heterogeneity than 
the label may suggest, both in terms of their history and civilization, and in terms of 
their institutional, military, geopolitical, cultural and social affairs. 
Measured by GDP, the label BRIC would be CBRI, in dollar terms, or CIRB, in PPP 
(Purchasing Power Parity). 
CIRB would be more accurate to designate the block when compared to other 
countries, and groups. 
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These countries differ deeply in performance and weight in the world economy. 
China grew more than twice the world average and one third more than the other 
emerging markets. 
IRe (India, Russia amd Brazil) 
Source: IMFIVVEO (PPP). 2008 
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I Source: IMFJWEO (ppp) 
A 2003 Goldman Sachs study suggested that total BRICs GDP would surpass the 
current G7 in 2035, but China alone was projected to overtake every developed 
country, the U.S. included, by 2040. Actually, China has distinguishing traits while 
compared to the other BRIC countries. Size, net reserves, domestic market, 
population, technology, entrepreneurship, nuclear weapons, and a command 
economy make China the only developing country candidate to be a global power. 
As emphasized by Ferguson and Schularick (2007), over the past ten years, to 
understand the world economy the most important phenomenon has been the 
relationship between China and America, dubbed Chimerica. Differently from many 
scholars that identified only signs of "crony capitalism" in China, Ferguson (2008) 
gave prominence to the Chinese concrete deeds compared to the prescriptions 
emanated - but not necessarily followed by - from Washington to be embraced by 
the rest of the world. In fact, according to his view, Chimerica was the real engine 
of the world economy. 
But Chimerica was deeply unbalanced as the Chin did the saving, and Merica the 
spending. The divergence in savings set off a remarkable explosion of debt in the 
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United States. To be expected, not only China but other Asian and developing 
countries around the world accumulated net reserves, run surpluses, and kept their 
exports affordable. Essentially, developing countries' savings stimulated a huge 
expansion in spending in the United States, made possible by negligent lending 
and sometimes deceiving financial environment, loosely controlled by national and 
international institutions. 
In geopolitical terms, the implications are: 
1. As a certainty, the combination of a financial collapse with a huge 
recession will change the world; 
2. The balance of global power will change; yet it is early to conclude that 
the U.S. power will decline irreversibly: the outcomes of the crisis have just 
started to come up, and what will happen depends on the unknown 
consequences and decisions still unmade; 
3. The legitimacy of the market will weaken, and the credibility of the US will 
be damaged; 
4. The authority of many developing countries - mainly China - will rise; 
5. China will make efforts to decouple from the U.S., relying less on exports, 
and looking for other spheres of global influence; 
6. The global arena will be rocked by the crisis, and the BRICs could be 
pOlitically reinvigorated. 
Maybe China is coming back to the place it lost since the Industrial Revolution, as 
some analysts predicted. Yet there are huge problems to face, both in terms of 
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Brazilian democracy and inequality reduction 
What about the quality of economic growth? 
Figures regarding income inequality around the world inspire no enthusiasm, yet 
we have astonishing advances coming from the Brazilian society. Although Brazil 
still exhibits very high rates of poverty and inequality, both rates have dropped 
dramatically over the past eight years, and they keep dropping. Behind that fall, 
there is a new combination of economic growth and a reasonably efficient and 
focused social safety network. 
Developing countries' states are facing challenges that require a new style of 
public action. For instance, the. Brazilian state under President Lula is more pro-
active, for sure. Some market assumptions asserted during the 1990s have been 
reoriented or even interrupted; industrial policies are back in the public and private 
agenda, and the idea of havinganational development project gained momentum. 
But at the same time, to mitigate social costs of markets and to take necessary 
economic measures related to misguided regulation, and market failures, the 
Brazilian state interferes only modestly, in a quasi-reactive style. 
Actually, some market reforms could undermine the developmental and crisis-
solving potential of the state. For instance, the de facto autonomy of the Brazilian 
Central Bank reveals loss of state power, previously concentrated in the Ministry of 
Finance. By the same token, lowering export-import barriers made the economy 
more open than in the 1990s. 
Simultaneously, such political decisions reinforced the state social-structuring 
power, since the importance of domestic institutions has been enhanced, resulting 
in positive externalities to the economy and more legitimacy to the government. 
The changes happen at different levels and spheres, and there is a new mix of 
synergies between public and private, translated by a set of new institutional 
arrangements and policies, aimed at supporting a dialogue between civil society, 
business sector, and the state. 
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In Brazil, differently from China, and even Russia, this stream flows from 
democracy; that is why the Brazilian experience under Lula functions as a barrier, 
a real political obstacle, to the temptations to return to the old days that have 
marked negatively Latin America4 • 
Two tales could put the whole issue in a nutshell: (0 New multinational companies, 
and (ii) Inequality reduction. 
(i) New mUltinational companies. For years, statism has been 
associated with ultimately unsuccessful, inward-oriented development 
strategies, placing the notion of public intervention into question. The 
public interventions at the foreign relations level diversified the 
Brazilian trade mix, its export-destinies and enlarged its markets. At 
the sectoral. level, the state intervened through taxes, and influenced 
credit, input, risk, information, and distribution markets; the state also 
promoted economic reorientation - along the lines of international 
comparative advantage - more rapidly and at lower costs than 
market forces would achieve on their own. Recent data released by 
the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA, 2007) show that 
companies in Brazil remain strong competitors in global markets in 
standardized agricultural and industrial goods. 
However the data show also that a small, but important group of 
Brazilian companies - responsible for more than 25% of industrial 
sales - is participating in international markets via exports of medium 
and high-technology goods. This group of highly competitive Brazilian 
firms generates positive growth spillovers in terms of wage and 
productivity. 
Contrary to expectations in Brazil about a regressive specialization in 
terms of export products following liberalization (and Dutch disease), 
the new competitive environment is unleashing new business 
perspectives associated with innovation. 
4 As insinuated by Chavez, for example. 
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The Brazilian industrial elite's ability to successfully compete in the 
global economy is rooted in improved innovative capacity. In 
response to international and domestic conditions, these innovative 
firms have changed their business strategies and also their attitudes 
towards technology, innovation and employment. That is, public 
action to promote specific new exports sectors has been combined 
with a gradually declining and sectorally differential tariff regime as 
part of an industrial policy aimed at export orientation. In doing so, 
traditional and nontraditional exports sectors can be supported while 
adjustment (not deindustrialization) in manufacturing is promoted. 
The Brazilian companies, exposed to fierce completion during the 
1990s, and stimulated by public policies dealing with credit, 
infrastructure etc., started imitating, mimicking, copying and, at the 
same time, improving their knowledge-creation systems. It was not a 
matter of public policy or of a more competitive climate per se, but a 
new combination that nurtured a concrete transformation inside 
companies. They have adjusted themselves to the new global 
competition, benefited from government incentives, and developed 
innovative capacities, processes, organizational forms, strategies, 
new-type networks, and business models. In the process, they might 
be giving birth to a new entrepreneurship in South America's largest 
economy. 
(ii) Inequality reduc.tion. Brazilian recent growth is being felt in nearly all 
parts of the economy. Most importantly, Brazil has fueled growth 
through a combination of respect for markets, state intervention in the 
economy, and targeted social programs, which are lifting millions out 
of the poverty line. ' 
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Historically famous for its unequal distribution of wealth, Brazil has 
shrunk its income gap by six percentage points since 2001, more 
than any other country in South America this decade, as recognized 
by the World Bank, and in contrast to China, India, Russia and most 
DECO countries, where inequality is raising. 
Brazil: Inequality reached the lowest level 
in 30 years 
(Gini Index - 1977-2007) 
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While the top 10 percent in Brazil saw their cumulative income rise by 
7% from 2001 to 2006, the bottom 10% shot up by 58% percent 
(Neri, 2009). The government has deepened and unified many 
existing social programs, created new ones, and developed a 
microloans system across the country. 
Other programs, like Bolsa Familia, transfer cash directly to millions 
of poor Brazilians. Bolsa Familia, which reaches more than 11 million 
families nationwide (around 45 million people), with an annual budget 
of about US$ 2 billion, has been far more effective at raising per 
capita incomes than recent increases in the minimum wage, which 
has risen 36 percent since 2003. Each family is entitled to receiving 
the benefits only if their children go to school and meet doctors 
regularly. 
The bottom-up nature of such social programs has helped expand 
formal and informal employment. Actually, the combination of 
different social policies under low inflation growth - substantially 
helped by cash transfers and minimum wage level improvement -
sustains the current poverty and inequality reduction virtuous cycle in 
Brazil. The number of people under the poverty line - about US$ 2 
per day - fell by 32% from 2004 to 2006. 
Six preliminary conclusions 
1. Under the acronym BRIC there are different economies, markets, military 
and technological powers. Besides their traditional cultural and historical 
differences, the four BRICs occasionally appear acting together in the world 
scenario, but usually they compete for markets and international positions. 
Beyond their contrasts, BRIC could survive only as a political artifact. 
2. Emerging economies have been growing faster than developed countries for 
several decades, and promoting a deep impact on developed countries' 
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inflation, interest rates, wages and profits. At the heart of this shift are the 
BRIC countries, which have been propelled by a Chinese engine. Due to its 
dimension and global weigh, what happens to China is crucial for the 
BRICs, for all developing countries, and the world. Actually, China is the 
only emerging country which is able to become a global power. 
3. Maybe the global recession put a stop in their growth. However, there are 
signs telling that it should happen only momentarily, as the downturn is 
shrinking the richest economies, but only slowing the emergent giants. 
Apparently, in both cases the "symbiotic relationship" between the U.S. and 
China, christened Chimerica by Fergunson and Schularick, is about to end. 
If the BRICs restore their growth rapidly, they could play an active political 
role to push the global economy out of the crisis, and providing the biggest 
repositioning of nations in the world arena since the industrial revolution. 
4. Recent developing countries trajectory has raised many questions about the 
conditions and state of the state. The old debate about the declining state 
has shifted, as ha~ the view that free-markets are simply expanding. No 
doubt developing countries states have altered dramatically their real policy 
capacities, institutions, and political powers. Since the 90's, most emergent 
economies, mainly in Latin America, are no longer seen to wear the 
straitjacket suggested by neo-classic orthodoxy. Actually, almost 
everywhere, states have never been really in retreat, though they have 
definitely changed. 
5. There is a new political animal, asking for theory-building; it is different both 
from the free-market friendly state proposed by the World Bank and IMF in 
the last quarter of the 20th century, and the developmental state Asian Tiger 
style. National states have responded to globalization pressures through 
domestic institutions, and according to their interests, passions and values 
historically structured. As some other developing countries, Brazil is 
renewing institutions, promoting interactions between the public and private 
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sector, and expanding social safety networks. These processes go through 
- and are enabled by - democracy. 
6. The old-style developmental state is dead, but this does not mean that the 
role of the state is declining. States have lost the ability to solely define the 
necessary development policies, but they are capable of building new 
institutions, molding the economic environment, and promoting new 
interactions between the public and private sector. For instance, it is true 
that the role of the states has increased in Latin America since 2000. But, in 
an apparent paradox, their economies are much more open than before. 
Larger states such as the BRIG countries playa new and important role in 
facilitating market reforms, as pointed out 'by Weiss (2005: 352): 
"globalization reinforces and augments the state's centrality to social life". 
Social scientists need to elaborate more on these change processes. There is a 
long road ahead for developing countries. Most of them, like Brazil, are strongly 
committed to democracy, and are heavily investing in strengthening their social-
security networks, in order to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. If the current 
crisis permits, they might meet new and superior development syntheses. 
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